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DISPROPORTIONATE DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF 
ABORIGINAL PRISONERS: A CONFLICT OF LAW THAT 
AUSTRALIA SHOULD ADDRESS 
Megan A. Winder† 
Abstract: In 2006, Australia’s Parliament banned all prisoners from voting.  A 
year later, Vickie Lee Roach, a female prisoner of Aboriginal descent, challenged the 
blanket ban promulgated in the 2006 amendment to the Commonwealth Electoral Act of 
1918 (“Electoral Act”).  Vickie won, but in a limited way.  The High Court found an 
implied right to vote in the Australian Constitution, but held that Parliament could limit 
such voting, as it did in the Electoral and Referendum Amendment of 2004 (“E & R 
Amendment”), disenfranchising any prisoner serving three or more years in jail. 
This Comment argues that the E & R Amendment conflicts with Australia’s 
obligations under the United Nations’ International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, codified by Australia’s Racial Discrimination Act of 
1975 (“RDA”).  The RDA mandates that Indigenous citizens be treated equally to non-
Indigenous citizens, including with respect to voting rights and opportunities to 
participate in political life.  The E & R Amendment disenfranchises a significant portion 
of the prison population—a large percentage of which is Aboriginal.  Disproportionate 
disenfranchisement of this sort constitutes indirect discrimination and perpetuates racism 
against Aboriginal people, preventing meaningful participation in their own communities.  
To rectify the problem, Parliament should repeal the three-year disenfranchisement 
provision of the E & R Amendment. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At 3:45 AM on December 14, 2002, Vickie Lee Roach and her ex-
boyfriend were caught while committing a robbery in Mordialloc, a town in 
Victoria, Australia.1  The duo stashed some stolen goods in the trunk of the 
car and fled, with Vickie as driver, at speeds of up to 80 miles per hour.2  
Neither Vickie nor her ex-boyfriend were licensed to drive.3  Vickie later 
said she had wanted to pull over as soon as she saw the police in pursuit, but 
did not because her ex-boyfriend threatened to kill her.4  At the urging of her 
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ex-boyfriend, Vickie continued the high-speed escape.5  At the time of the 
incident, she had alcohol, four kinds of tranquillizers, morphine, and a 
cannabis-related substance in her blood.6 
Vickie’s getaway ended when she struck a stopped car at a traffic 
light.7  The impact engulfed both vehicles in flames.8  The 21-year-old man 
in the other car suffered extensive injuries, including burns on his scalp, 
face, ears, back, arms, knees, and internal organs.9  The burns covered 
upwards of forty-five percent of his body, requiring several operations to 
attach skin grafts and insert wires into his fingers.10 
Vickie Lee Roach’s story began long before that night.  At the age of 
two, she was taken from her mother and her Aboriginal community.11  Like 
many children of the “Stolen Generation,” she was placed with a non-
Aboriginal foster family.12  The Stolen Generation is the name critics have 
given to the government-sanctioned program in which Aboriginal children 
were forcibly removed from their parents and communities to be placed with 
non-Indigenous families or orphanages that would “re-socialize” them, in 
large part by eliminating traces of Aboriginal heritage.13  Vickie was raised 
by foster parents and, after leaving them, became a “delinquent” and drug 
addict.14  Between 1976 and 2003, she had 125 convictions or findings of 
guilt from twenty-three court appearances.15   
Vickie is now fifty years old.  She is serving a six-year prison 
sentence for negligently causing serious injury to the other driver.16  While 
living in prison, she has completed a Master’s degree in professional writing 
and is studying for a Ph.D. in creative writing.17  In addition to having 

















 Jewel Topsfield, Leading the Charge, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, May 23, 2009, 
http://www.smh.com.au/national/leading-the-charge-20090522-bia8.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2010). 
13
 See PETER READ, NEW SOUTH WALES DEPT. OF ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS, THE STOLEN 
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 R. v. Roach (2005) V.S.C.A. 162 (Austl.) (imposing a total of six years’ imprisonment with non-
parole period of four years).  The judge sentenced Vickie to two years imprisonment for burglary, twelve 
months imprisonment for theft, two years imprisonment for conduct endangering persons, three years 
imprisonment for two counts of negligently causing serious injury. 
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published poetry and a novel, Vickie is a “peer educator” at the jail.18  
Through these experiences, Vickie became educated and politically aware.19 
As an adult, Vickie enrolled to vote in the Kooyong electorate,20 but 
was disenfranchised in Commonwealth elections based on the length of her 
prison sentence.21  Disenfranchisement is defined as the act of taking away 
the right to vote in public elections from a citizen or class of citizens.22  If 
Vickie were serving a one-year prison sentence, she would be eligible to 
vote.23  Instead, because she is serving a sentence of greater than three years, 
she is barred under the Electoral and Referendum Act of 2004 from 
participating in state and federal elections during her incarceration.24  Vickie 
was charged with one count of burglary, one count of theft, one count of 
conduct endangering persons, and two counts of negligently causing serious 
injury.25  While the judge made some of her sentences run concurrently, he 
did not do so for all of them.26 
Federal statutes govern elections in Australia.27  The first statute to 
address felon voting rights, the 1902 Commonwealth Franchise Act, 
disenfranchised individuals convicted and sentenced for any offense 
punishable by imprisonment for one year or longer.28  This provision 
remained substantially the same when the Commonwealth Electoral Act 
1918 (the “Electoral Act”) was enacted, replacing the 1902 version.  The 
Electoral Act stood until 1983, when disqualification was amended to apply 
to persons “under sentence . . . punishable . . . [by] the Commonwealth or of 
the State or Territory by imprisonment for five years or longer.”29  







 See Australian Electoral Commission, 2007 Federal Election: Profile of the Electoral Division of 
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In 2004, Parliament amended the Electoral Act and its five-year prison 
term requirement for voting disqualification, through passage of the 
Electoral and Referendum Amendment (“E & R Amendment”).30  The E & 
R Amendment demarcated a different enfranchisement line; namely, 
disenfranchising prisoners serving three years or more.31  Parliament thought 
the three-year ban appropriate to disallow felons from voting for at least one 
scheduled federal election cycle.32  In 2006, a conservative Parliament again 
amended the Act, enacting section 93(8AA) of the Electoral Act, providing 
that a person who is serving a sentence of imprisonment for an offense 
against any law is not entitled to vote in any federal election.33  In September 
2007, the High Court of Australia34 heard a challenge to the blanket ban on 
disenfranchisement imposed by the amendments.35  Vickie Lee Roach 
launched the challenge.36  
In Roach v. Electoral Commissioner, the High Court, by a 4-2 
majority,37 held that the 2006 Amendments were inconsistent with the 
system of representative democracy established by the Constitution.38  The 
High Court held that voting in elections stands at the heart of a system of 
representative government.39  Disenfranchisement of a group of adult 
citizens, without a “substantial reason,” is arbitrary and inconsistent with 
such a system.40  While the 2006 Amendment was invalid, the High Court 
specifically held that the 2004 E & R Amendment disqualifying prisoners 
serving sentences of three years or more was valid and remained operative.41  
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 Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Electoral Integrity and Other Measures), 2005, No. 95 
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 Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Prisoner Voting and Other Measures) Act, 2004, No. 123 
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systems.  
35




 Id. (Callinan, J. did not take part in the decision).  
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 See id. ¶ 92. 
39
 Id. ¶ 80. 
40
 Roach v. Electoral Comm’r (2007) 233 C.L.R. 162, ¶ 7 (Austl.). 
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Roach argued that constraints derived from the text and structure of 
the Constitution rendered the blanket ban invalid.42  The majority of the 
High Court of Australia found that the right to vote existed implicitly in the 
text of the Constitution itself.43  Chief Justice Gleeson, in his majority 
opinion, concluded that sections seven and twenty-four of the Constitution, 
which require senators and members of the House of Representatives to be 
“directly chosen by the people,” mandated universal suffrage.44  Chief 
Justice Gleeson further expounded that representative government has 
evolved, rendering sections seven and twenty-four as a “constitutional 
protection of the right to vote.”45  In so finding, however, the Chief Justice 
left open the possibility that Parliament may create exceptions to the 
universal suffrage mandate that fit within the bounds of the Constitution.46  
In fact, the Chief Justice stated:  
[T]he franchise is critical to representative government, and lies 
at the centre of our concept of participation in the life of the 
community, and of citizenship, disenfranchisement of any 
group of adult citizens on a basis that does not constitute a 
substantial reason for exclusion from such participation would 
not be consistent with choice by the people.47 
Determining that franchise is crucial to Australian citizenship was simply the 
first step. 
With this in mind, the joint majority came up with a test to determine 
whether the blanket ban had a nexus between the disqualification criterion 
and the original conduct that evinced culpability incompatible with 
participation in the electoral process.48  The test required determining 
whether the impugned legislation impermissibly limited the operation of the 
system of representative government mandated by the Constitution.49  A 
disqualification was only permissible if a “substantial reason” existed for 
such action.50  The joint majority further defined “substantial reason” as any 
disqualification reasonably appropriate or adapted to serve an end that is 
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 Written Submission of Plaintiff at 2, Roach v. Electoral Comm’r (2007) 233 C.L.R. 162 (Austl.) 
(H.C.A. May 9, 2010) (No. M19). 
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 Roach v. Electoral Comm’r (2007) 233 C.L.R. 162 (Austl.). 
44
 See AUSTL. CONST., §§ 7, 24. 
45
 Roach v. Electoral Comm’r (2007) 233 C.L.R. 162 (Austl.). 
46
 Id. ¶ 6. 
47
 See id. ¶ 7 (citing McGinty v. Western Australia (1996) 186 C.L.R. 140, ¶ 29 (Austl.)). 
48
 See id. ¶ 83. 
49
 See id. ¶ 84. 
50
 Id. ¶¶ 83, 85. 
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“compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system 
of representative government.”51 
The High Court determined that the 2006 blanket ban operated 
without regard to culpability other than that which may be attributed to 
prisoners in general.52  This ultimately led the High Court to conclude that 
the “net of disqualification [was] cast too wide”53 because it went “beyond 
what is reasonably appropriate or adapted (or ‘proportionate’) to the 
maintenance of representative government.”54  In striking down the blanket 
ban disenfranchising prisoners, the majority implied that the mere fact of 
imprisonment does not necessarily indicate criminal conduct serious enough 
to warrant exclusion from such a fundamental right of citizenship.55  Despite 
reaching this conclusion, the High Court held that the legislation in place 
prior to the 2006 amendments remained valid and continued to apply.56  
Accordingly, any Australian serving a sentence of three or more years for an 
offense against the federal government is not entitled to vote.57  Thus, while 
Roach’s challenge was successful in that a majority of the High Court 
accepted that an implied right to vote existed in the Constitution and the 
blanket ban was unconstitutional, Vickie herself was personally unsuccessful 
because her sentence put her on the wrong side of the line drawn by the High 
Court.  By reverting back to the three-year provision, the High Court’s 
decision potentially creates several conflicts of law, and allows for the 
continuation of a public policy that disproportionately affects Aboriginal 
persons. 
This Comment argues that the reversion to the three-year sentencing 
cutoff under the E & R Amendment violates the Racial Discrimination Act 
[of] 1975 (“RDA”)58 by indirectly discriminating against Aboriginal people 
and that Parliament should repeal the three-year sentencing cutoff, so as not 
to disenfranchise prisoners.  Part II provides context for voting rights, as 
well as historical background supporting the idea that Aboriginal prisoners 
are disproportionately disenfranchised.  Part III discusses the indirect 
discrimination analysis that the High Court should use in determining that 
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 Roach v. Electoral Comm’r (2007) 233 C.L.R. 162, ¶¶ 83, 85 (Austl.). 
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 See id. 
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 Id. ¶ 95. 
54
 Id.  
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 See id. ¶ 9, 23.  
56
 See id. ¶¶ 97-101. 
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 Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Prisoner Voting and Other Measures) Act, 2004, No. 123 
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 Racial Discrimination Act, 1975, No. 52 (Austl.). 
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the E & R Amendment should be struck down.  Finally, Part IV argues that 
Parliament should remove prisoner voting restrictions altogether, thus 
streamlining the provisions governing prisoner voting rights.  
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The History of Aboriginal Voting Rights in Australia 
Over time, there has been a progression of political inclusion making 
voting a constitutional right shared by Aboriginal people.59  During the 
period from 1890 to 1940, biological racism was prevalent in Australia and 
“[n]on-European blood imposed a permanent barrier to admission into 
Australian society.”60  The first federal Parliament passed the 
Commonwealth Franchise Act in 1902, granting universal adult suffrage to 
both men and women, but explicitly excluded any Aboriginal Australians not 
previously enfranchised by the states in which they resided.61  In 1949, the 
Electoral Act was amended to provide Aboriginal persons with voting rights 
at the Commonwealth level in cases where they had previously acquired it at 
the state level.62  Finally, in 1967, Aboriginal people in Australia were 
granted full citizenship and gained the right be to be included in the national 
census.63  
1. Voting in Australia Goes Beyond an Implied Constitutional Right—It 
Is Also Compulsory 
The right to vote was not among the rights explicitly articulated in the 
Constitution.64 Often described as a “Washminster” system, Australian 
                                           
 
59
 See Michael Murphy, Representing Indigenous Self-Determination, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 185, 188 
(2008). 
60
 ANDREW MARKUS, AUSTRALIAN RACE RELATIONS: 1788-1993 111 (1994). 
61
 See Commonwealth Franchise Act, 1902, No. 8 § 4 (Austl.). 
62
 JOHN CHESTERMAN & BRIAN GALLIGAN, CITIZENS WITHOUT RIGHTS: ABORIGINES AND 
AUSTRALIAN CITIZENSHIP 8 (1997). 
63
 MICHAEL BANTON, INTERNATIONAL ACTION AGAINST RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 281 (1996). The 
Constitution Alteration (Aboriginals) 1967 was a referendum that amended § 51 of the Constitution and 
removed § 127 from the Constitution.  Section 51 stated that the Federal Government had the power to 
make laws with respect to “the people of any race, other than the Aboriginal race in any State, for whom it 
is deemed necessary to make special laws.”  The referendum removed the phrase “other than the Aboriginal 
race in any State,” giving the Commonwealth the power to make laws specifically to benefit Aboriginal 
people.  The referendum also removed § 127, which said: “In reckoning the numbers of the people of the 
Commonwealth, or of a State or other part of the Commonwealth, Aboriginal natives shall not be counted,” 
thus providing that Aboriginal people could be counted in census data.  
64
 See AUSTL. CONST.; see also JEROME DAVIDSON, DEPT. OF PARLIAMENTARY SERVS., INSIDE 
OUTCASTS: PRISONERS AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN AUSTRALIA (2004). 
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constitutional law was influenced by a blend of American and British 
practices.65  For instance, the Australian constitution includes the American 
practices of federalism and separation of powers, combined with a written 
constitution, but, like the British system, it has no Bill of Rights.66  From 
inception, the Australian Constitution gave power primarily to the federal 
Parliament to create and change the laws of the land.67  This power includes 
mediating conflicts between two existing laws, like issues with voting in 
federal elections.68  
The Constitution requires a system of representative government.  
Section seven, dealing with the composition of the Senate, and section 
twenty-four, providing for the composition of the House of Representatives, 
both require that the respective members be “directly chosen by the 
people.”69 The High Court has held that these provisions provide a system of 
representative government.70 
Australian electoral law primarily derives from two sources, the 
Constitution and the Electoral Act.  The Australian right to vote is implied in 
the Constitution.71  Voting is also compulsory72 for all eligible Australian 
citizens.73  Although the Constitution provides for the basic legal framework 
for representative government at the federal level, the Electoral Act provides 
supplementary assistance for the conduct of federal elections.74  In effect, it 
provides the legal basis for the administration of elections, including the 
creation and maintenance of an electoral roll.75  However, the Constitution 
makes only general provisions regarding electoral rights and the judiciary 
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 Timothy Vines, An Australian Constitutional Experience, Vol. II CROSS-SEC. J. 167, 168 n.2 
(2006). 
66
 Jason L. Pierce, A Sketch of Australian Constitutional History, 10 GREENBAG 327, 342 (2007).  
67
 See Gerard Carney, The High Court and the Constitutionalism of Electoral Law, in REALISING 
DEMOCRACY: ELECTORAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA 170, 171 (Graeme Orr et al. eds., 2003). 
68
 See Pierce, supra note 66. 
69
 See AUSTL. CONST., §§ 7, 24. 
70
 Attorney-General (Ex. Rel. McKinlay) v. The Commonwealth (1975) 135 C.L.R. 1, 55-56 (Austl.) 
(Stephen J.); Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v. The Commonwealth (1992) 177 C.L.R. 106, 137-38, 
150, 168, 184-85, 210-11, 229 (Austl.); Langer v. The Commonwealth (1996) 186 C.L.R. 302, 304 
(Austl.). 
71
 See Roach v. Electoral Comm’r (2007) 233 C.L.R. 162 (Austl.). 
72
 Commonwealth Electoral Office Act, 1924, No. 10 (Austl.) (mandating compulsory voting). 
73
 See SCOTT BENNETT, DEPT. OF PARLIAMENTARY SERVS., COMPULSORY VOTING IN AUSTRALIAN 
NATIONAL ELECTIONS (2008). 
74
 PAMELA R. DUDGEON & PATRICIA M. HINCKS, AUSTRL. ELECTORAL COMM’N, DEMOCRACY 
RULES: AN ELECTORAL EDUCATION RESOURCE 7 (2007), available at http://www.aec.gov.au/ 
pdf/education/ resources/democracy_rules/Teacher_Guide_by_section/Introduction.pdf. 
75
 Commonwealth Electoral Act, 1918, No. 27, § 7 (Austl.); see also Australian Electoral 
Commission webpage, http://www.aec.gov.au/About_AEC/index.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2010). 
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has been reluctant to read new, explicit rights into the Constitution’s text.  As 
a result, courts rarely subject electoral laws to judicial review on rights 
grounds,76 and thus electoral law is more a product of Parliamentary creation 
than judicial molding.  
The compulsory nature of voting deeply affects Aboriginal people in a 
system of representative government.77  Compulsory voting attempts to 
ensure that all qualified citizens have a say in the operation of their 
government.78  When Aboriginal people are disenfranchised 
disproportionately, their government of elected officials no longer 
adequately represents them. 
2. Australian History Indicates that Felon Disenfranchisement Is 
Ineffective as a Punishment  
Felon disenfranchisement laws date back to ancient Greece and Rome, 
as well as Medieval Europe, when offenders were banished from the 
community as part of their “civil death,” which often included the loss of 
property rights and the ability to pass property to their heirs.79  As early as 
1915, Australian residency qualifications were used to deny all prisoners the 
right to vote.80  
Until 1983,81 persons sentenced, or even subject to be sentenced, for 
an offense punishable by imprisonment for one or more years could not 
vote.82  From 1983 to 1995, any person who was convicted and was under 
sentence for an offense punishable by imprisonment for five or more years 
was disenfranchised.83  From 1995 to 2004, a prisoner actually had to be 
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 Graeme Orr, Bryan Mercurio & George Williams, Australian Electoral Law: A Stocktake, 2 
ELECTION L.J. 383, 384 (2003). 
77
 Commonwealth Electoral Legislation Amendment Act, 1983, No. 144, § 23 (Austl.).  
78
 JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE ON ELECTORAL MATTERS, PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
AUSTRALIA, THE 2004 FEDERAL ELECTION: REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE CONDUCT OF THE 2004 
FEDERAL ELECTION AND MATTERS RELATED THERETO ch. 8, § 40 (2005) [hereinafter FEDERAL ELECTION 
2004]. 
79
 Courtney Artzner, Note, Check Marks the Spot: Evaluating the Fundamental Right to Vote and 
Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States and Canada, 13 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 423, 427 (2007); 
see also JAMIE FELLNER & MARC MAUER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH AND THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LOSING 
THE VOTE: THE IMPACT OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES (1998), 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/File/FVR/fd_losingthevote.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2010). 
80
 Sandey Fitzgerald, Ending Felon Disenfranchisement—What Voting Rights Should Prisoners 
Have?, DEMOCRATIC AUDIT OF AUSTL., July 7, 2005, at 2 n.8, http://arts.anu.edu.au/ democraticaudit/ 
papers/200507_fitz_felons.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2010). 
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serving five or more years to suffer disenfranchisement.84  From 2004 to 
2006, Parliament reduced the threshold to three years.85  In 2006, the 
Electoral Act was amended to provide that prisoners serving any sentence 
were disqualified from voting in federal elections.86  The decision in the 
Vickie Lee Roach case declared the 2006 Amendment unconstitutional, 
effectively reinstating the three-year sentencing cutoff.87  Today, voting is no 
longer a privilege held by a select few, but a right and obligation possessed 
by all mentally competent adults—except those serving a prison term of 
three or more years.88 
3. Aboriginal Voting Rights Are Critical to Self-Determination 
Aboriginal enfranchisement supports democracy and legitimizes the 
elected government.  Australia’s history of discrimination89 against 
Aboriginal people through political, social, and economic means is 
substantial.90  The primary historical justification for denying Aboriginal 
people the right to vote was their “lack of civilization.”91  During the 
twentieth century, in certain states with significant Aboriginal populations 
such as Queensland and Western Australia, fears surfaced that the large 
number of potential Aboriginal voters might threaten white dominance at the 
ballot box.92 
Aboriginal people have lacked political rights for centuries.93  One 
major impediment to expansion of Aboriginal rights was that expansion 
proposals failed to muster consensus among the majority non-Indigenous 
population.94  Accordingly, changes in Aboriginal rights tended to mirror 
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 This is a minor, but potentially important distinction from those who could be sentenced to prison 
and those who were actually sentenced to prison. 
85
 Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Prisoner Voting and Other Measures) Act, 2004, No. 123 
(Austl.). 
86
 Prime Minister John Howard’s party had control of Parliament. Electoral and Referendum 
Amendment Act, 2006 §§3, 4 (Austl.). 
87
 Roach v. Electoral Comm’r (2007) 233 C.L.R. 162 (Austl.). 
88
 The Constitution delineates who may and may not vote broadly.  
89
 See HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, FACE THE FACTS (2005 ed.), 
available at  http://www.hreoc.gov.au/racial_discrimination/face_facts/index.html. 
90
 See Australia Apology to Aborigines, B.B.C., Feb. 13, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/7241965.stm (last visited Jan. 2, 2009). 
91
 See Murphy, supra note 59, at 188. 
92
 See CHESTERMAN, supra note 62, at 13. 
93
 See, e.g., Mabo v. Queensland, (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.) (recognizing that native title exists). 
94
 See CHESTERMAN, supra note 62, at 13. 
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changes in the composition of the national government.95  Few voices have 
spoken assertively for Aborigines. The legitimacy of an election stems from 
the fact that the government is elected by a majority of the population.96  For 
Aboriginal people to enact change and truly participate, they must have their 
own voice—the power to vote as a unified population.  The 
disenfranchisement of so many Aborigines impedes the Constitution’s goal 
of a democratically elected government. 
Aboriginal voting rights are critical to self-determination and 
participation in government.  Securing fundamental rights for all Aboriginal 
people in Australia is reinforced by reference to human rights principles that 
are already part, or are becoming part, of international law.97  Generally, the 
issue of disenfranchisement is not one of major public interest, suggesting 
that political parties are going to be the only way to instigate change.98  
Enfranchisement in Australia, similar to the United States, is an issue that 
splits along party lines.99  The rights of the convicted prisoner will be 
influenced by who has a majority in Parliament.  In this light, the catch-22 
facing Aboriginal prisoners becomes apparent:  the Aboriginal people have 
been disproportionately excised from the voting populace by being 
imprisoned at a much higher rate, yet voting is the strongest means available 
in a democracy to secure their own self-determination.  
B. By Ratifying the Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination and Enacting the RDA, Parliament Provided for Equal 
Treatment of Aboriginals 
Australia has struggled with discrimination since its colonization.100  
In order to combat such discrimination, the Australian Parliament has 
enacted a number of different measures to tackle issues such as racial 
discrimination, sex discrimination, and disability discrimination.101  Among 
this legislation, Australia ratified the International Convention on the 
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Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”) on September 
30, 1975.102   
By ratifying the CERD, Parliament agreed to work towards 
eliminating discrimination within Australia.  The CERD requires states to 
guarantee the right to vote—including the right to participate in elections 
and to stand for election—to everyone, without distinction as to race.103  The 
CERD also obliges states to amend, rescind, or nullify any laws that have the 
effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination, or of strengthening 
racial division.104  To fulfill its obligations under the CERD, Australia passed 
the Racial Discrimination Act of 1975 (“RDA”).  In doing so, Australia 
pledged to: 
[R]eview government, national and local policies, and to 
change, or abolish, laws and regulations which create or 
continue racial discrimination; [and to] . . . take any special 
measures needed to make sure that disadvantaged racial groups 
have full and equal access to human rights and to basic 
freedoms; and . . . [to] tackle the prejudices that lead to racial 
discrimination, and to eliminate the barriers between races.105 
While Australia lacks a constitutionally entrenched Bill of Rights, the RDA 
has provided sufficient authority to protect Aboriginal rights in other 
contexts.106  For example, some of the basic rights and freedoms guaranteed 
under the CERD and the RDA include: “[t]he right to be treated equally by 
the courts and other tribunals, [t]he right to be protected by the government 
against violence or bodily harm, [t]he right to vote and take part in 
government and to have equal access to public services.”107  This suggests 
that the Australian Parliament, upon enacting such legislation, intended for 
Aboriginal people to be treated equally, free from discrimination.  
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III. THE E & R AMENDMENT HAS DISCRIMINATORY EFFECTS THAT VIOLATE 
THE RDA’S DEFINITION OF INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION  
The RDA is the most significant federal protection against racial 
discrimination in Australia.108  It prohibits “any act involving a distinction, 
exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent or national 
or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing 
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of any human 
right or fundamental freedom . . . .”109  Historically, anti-discrimination 
legislation bans discriminatory practices on direct and indirect levels.110  On 
a direct level, anti-discrimination legislation bans any discriminatory 
practice that overtly differentiates by reason of some irrelevant or 
impermissible consideration.111  On an indirect level, anti-discriminatory 
legislation bans any action that has the same or substantially the same effect, 
thus creating discrimination.112  Direct discrimination and indirect 
discrimination each have distinct burdens of proof that a plaintiff must meet 
in order to successfully challenge a potentially discriminatory law on RDA 
grounds.113  While the E & R Amendment does not directly discriminate, it 
is a prime example of legislation that discriminates indirectly.  
A. The RDA Does Not Prohibit the E & R Amendment on Direct 
Discrimination Grounds  
The E & R Amendment does not fit within the direct discrimination 
classification of prohibited legislation.  To demonstrate direct discrimination, 
the plaintiff must prove that the legislation meets two requirements: 1) that 
the act has “the purpose or effect” of impairing political freedom, and 2) that 
the act was based on race.114  While the first prong may be met here by 
demonstrating a significantly disproportionate effect on Aboriginal people, 
the second prong is a stumbling block.115  There is not a clear racial basis for 
the E & R Amendment, and as such, the legislation would fail to be 
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considered directly discriminatory, pursuant to the Briginshaw test.116  
Rather, the court should examine the E & R Amendment through the lens of 
indirect discrimination.  
The High Court has not addressed whether or not direct and indirect 
discrimination are to be treated as mutually exclusive classes.117  In the 
absence of such a classification, federal courts have treated them 
separately.118  In fact, one such court held “that the material difference in 
treatment is based on the status . . . of that person, notwithstanding an 
absence of intention or motive on the part of the alleged discriminator.”119  
That court further held that where a state government acting with the best of 
intentions unintentionally discriminates, such action does not rise to the level 
of the Briginshaw test. 120  Such is the case here. 
B. The RDA Prohibits the E & R Amendment on Indirect Discrimination 
Grounds 
Indirect race discrimination focuses on the effect on a person of 
particular practices or policies that disadvantage them.121  In 1990, the RDA 
was amended in order to provide a way to reverse legislation or individual 
action that indirectly discriminates against citizens.122  According to the 
amended section, 9(1A), racial discrimination is established if a condition or 
requirement was imposed on a complainant that a) was not reasonable in the 
circumstances, and b) had the effect of interfering with the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, by persons of [Aboriginal 
descent] of any relevant human right or fundamental freedom.123  Political 
rights, in particular the right to participate in elections by voting on the basis 
of universal and equal suffrage, is included in the definition of human right 
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or fundamental freedom, according to section 9(2) of the Act.124  The 
amendment further condemns any “act involving a distinction based on, or 
an act done by reason of, the other person’s race, colour, descent or national 
or ethnic origin.”125 
The legislative purpose for amending section 9 of the RDA was to 
directly address forms of discrimination that do not qualify as direct 
discrimination, but that clearly have a discriminatory effect on a racial 
group.126  As Mr. Melham, M.P., stated during the introduction of the 
legislation, the purpose was to determine “whether the imposed term, 
condition or requirement impacts disproportionately on persons of the same 
race etc. . . . . [meaning] it will not be necessary to establish that every 
person in that group needs to be affected to show a disproportionate 
impact . . . .”127 Thus, indirect racial discrimination contrary to section 9(1A) 
of the RDA is concerned with laws that are neutral on their face yet are 
discriminatory in their impact and outcome.128  In order to sustain a finding 
of indirect discrimination, a plaintiff must demonstrate two things: 1) that 
the legislation unreasonably violates guaranteed Constitutional or legislative 
rights, and 2) that the violation creates an adverse discriminatory effect.129 
1. Disenfranchisement Imposed by the E & R Amendment Violates the 
RDA’s Guarantee of Political Rights 
Disenfranchisement imposed by the E & R Amendment unreasonably 
violates the RDA’s guarantee of political rights, thus meeting the first prong 
of the indirect discrimination test.  To determine reasonableness, the High 
Court has adopted a passage speaking to section 5(2) of the Sex 
Discrimination Act that the test is “less demanding than one of necessity, but 
more demanding than one of convenience.”130  The Court further stated that 
“the criterion is an objective one, which requires the court to weigh the 
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nature and extent of the discriminatory effect . . . against the reasons 
advanced in favour of the requirement or condition on the other.”131  
In determining what constitutes “reasonable,” federal courts have 
looked at a variety of factors, including 1) whether the purpose of the 
legislation could be achieved without employing a discriminatory 
requirement, or by employing a requirement that is less discriminatory in its 
impact;132 2) whether the legislation is effective, efficient and convenient;133 
or 3) whether the legislation serves relevant policy objectives.134  While 
proponents argue that felon disenfranchisement qualifies under these factors, 
disenfranchisement is an unreasonable and ineffective punishment that is 
offensive to public policy.   
 
a. Proponents of Felon Disenfranchisement Justify Their Argument for 
the Three Year Rule on a Number of Grounds 
There are a number of arguments that proponents of felon 
disenfranchisement put forth to justify the diminution of the right to vote. 
Some such arguments are: 1) convicted felons are not trustworthy voters (i.e. 
they would vote for policies that help criminals); 2) convicted felons are not 
loyal to the republic; 3) felons will participate in electoral fraud; 4) logistical 
problems exist with inmate voting (i.e. in which jurisdiction would their 
votes count); 5) disenfranchisement is a legitimate aspect of criminal 
punishment.  The final justification is the most problematic because it is the 
most widely held, and likely the most supported by the public at large.135  
Disenfranchisement may be seen as a legitimate aspect of criminal 
punishment by certain groups and members in Parliament who may want to 
appear tough on crime and criminals.136  For example, in debating the 
implementation of the complete ban on prisoner voting, Mr. Nairn, MP, 
stated: “people who commit offences against society sufficient to warrant a 
prison term should not, while they are serving that prison term, be entitled to 
vote and elect the leaders of the society whose laws they have 
disregarded.”137  This sentiment is supported by other elected officials, like 
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Senator Eric Abetz who stated: “If you are not fit to walk the streets, as 
deemed by the judicial system . . . then chances are you’re not a fit and 
proper person to cast a vote in relation to the future of your country.”138  The 
members of Parliament who addressed this issue in the debates were likely 
swayed by the public’s distaste for allowing “killers . . . the right to vote.”139  
Thus, disenfranchisement was thought to serve as a form of retribution.140   
Disenfranchisement has also been proposed as a deterrent to future 
crime.  Prisons function within the criminal justice system “as a means to 
control [the] communities [and] maintain a stable system of order.”141  
Further, the commission of a crime and subsequent lawful conviction 
constitute an active and deliberate repudiation of the terms of the social 
contract a citizen is thought to abide by.142  Exclusion from the franchise is a 
penalty that signifies the criminal’s apparent desire to no longer be 
considered a member of the community in which he or she committed the 
crime.143  It can thus be argued that such exclusion, and resulting 
disenfranchisement, is a choice that each person must make upon deciding to 
break the law. 
 
b. Disenfranchisement Is an Unreasonable Means to Punish Citizens 
Disenfranchisement of prisoners is an inappropriate way of punishing 
citizens.  As one judge has noted:  
Prisoners are human beings . . . . [and] are also citizens of this 
country . . . . They should, so far as the law can allow, 
ordinarily have the same rights as all other persons . . . .  They 
have lost their liberty whilst in prison . . . .  [but] they have not 
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lost their human dignity or their right to equality before the 
law.144 
As a goal of the penal system, disenfranchisement is retributive to the 
extent that the offender is deprived of something they value.145  However, 
the disproportionate number of Aboriginal prisoners suggests that 
disenfranchisement, through the E & R Amendment, is not appropriate or 
adapted to serving a legitimate objective—namely, rehabilitation. The 
statement of purpose for the revised standard Guidelines for Corrections in 
Australia explicitly states that the community correctional services exist for 
the purposes of:  1) providing assessment and advice to sentencing and 
releasing authorities in the formulation of orders and directions for 
offenders; 2) to ensure that offenders fulfill the orders and directions of 
courts and releasing authorities; 3) to assist the rehabilitation of offenders 
through the adoption of productive, law-abiding lives in the community; 4) 
to contribute to public safety by preventing crime and through reducing 
recidivism; and 5) to provide offenders with an opportunity to make 
restitution to their victims or to the wider community.146  According to the 
Australian Institute of Criminology, which reports directly to the Minister of 
Home Affairs in the Attorney General’s office, the principles are intended to 
show the spirit in which correctional programs should be administered and 
the goals toward which administrators should aim.147  Nothing in the 
guidelines suggest that the punishment, either pre- or post-sentencing should 
serve retributive or deterrent purposes, nor does it say that the punishment 
should extend beyond incarceration, which is essentially what 
disenfranchisement does.148 
Disenfranchisement prevents reintegration of offenders into society, 
setting up a scenario where felons must abide by the law, after their lawful 
conviction, without the ability to vote to protect their future interests once 
out of prison.149  Further, denying prisoners the right to vote may undermine 
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respect for the rule of law because citizens who cannot participate in the 
making of laws have no incentive to recognize such authority.150  Social 
policy activists have condemned the retribution justification for 
disenfranchisement.151  Prisoners, like all citizens, have an interest in 
political issues.152  Disenfranchisement opponents claim that “by 
rationalizing and facilitating a tendency to localize the blame for crime in 
the individual, disenfranchisement helps to obscure the complexity of the 
roots of crime and their entanglement with contingent social structures,” 
such as lack of education or poverty.153  Disenfranchisement, therefore, 
prevents a nation from embracing a minority population, like the Aboriginal 
population, and hinders the democratic process.  Disenfranchisement, by 
definition, divests prisoners of freedom and voting rights.  Depriving 
citizens of their freedom and voting rights occurs primarily to protect the 
interests of the dominant class.154  In various jurisdictions outside of 
Australia—most notably Canada and the United Kingdom—prisoner 
disenfranchisement was found to not be rationally connected to 
rehabilitation, and was disallowed by those nations’ courts.155   
A policy of disenfranchisement of prisoners prevents full 
rehabilitation because it leaves the convicted, yet rehabilitated, felon with 
fewer rights than those guaranteed by full citizenship.  The E & R 
Amendment denies prisoners, particularly Aboriginal prisoners who are 
overrepresented in the prison system, compared to the overall prison 
population, the right to vote—in direct conflict with the RDA’s guarantee of 
equality. 
 
c. The Sentence Does Not Fit the Crime with Regard to the E & R 
Amendment 
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The right to vote freely for a chosen candidate is essential in a 
democratic society, and any restriction of this right undermines 
representative government.156  The Commonwealth mandates that all citizens 
vote, with very few limitations.157  Legitimacy of democratic governments 
depends on full franchise.158  In Australia, prisoners are required to vote 
unless they are serving a sentence of three or more years.159  In the case of a 
disenfranchised prisoner, the crime may have had nothing to do with his or 
her ability to vote.  If the crime leading to conviction were related to voting 
issues, such as bribery or extortion of public officials, perhaps 
disenfranchisement would be an appropriate punishment.  But in the current 
system, a person who was not convicted of crimes involving deceit is 
disenfranchised merely by virtue of the length of sentence.  
There are a number of situations exemplifying the disconnect between 
the type of crime and disenfranchisement imposed by legislation.160  Bribery 
is a prime example, where the seriousness of the crime is not reflected in the 
length of the sentence.  The Electoral Act section seventy-eight states that:  
“A person shall not improperly seek to influence a member of a 
Redistribution Committee for a State or the Australian Capital Territory, a 
member of an augmented Electoral Commission . . . in the performance of 
his or her duties . . . .”161  That section also describes the penalty:  2000 
dollars or imprisonment for twelve months, or both.162  Under the current 
scheme of disenfranchisement for sentences of three or more years, any 
person who sought to improperly influence an elected official would not lose 
his right to vote.  Thus, the crime need not have any connection to electoral 
or political processes or to the security of the state for the prisoner to be 
disenfranchised.163  Instead, a person who was not convicted of crimes 
involving deceit might be disenfranchised, whereas a person who was 
convicted of bribing an official could vote in every future election.164  The 
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three-year ban is arbitrary and injures the political freedom guaranteed by 
the RDA and implied in the Constitution.   
 
d. The E & R Amendment Lacks Equity and Is Fundamentally Unfair 
Disenfranchisement of felons is not uniform across Australia.165  The 
E & R Amendment is not applied equally across the country.166  Currently, 
the same offense may carry mandatory detention in one state but not in 
another, demonstrating the inconsistency of how offenders are actually 
punished.167 
Every Australian jurisdiction sets its own rules for the franchise.168  
While some states adopt the changes to the Commonwealth franchise as a 
matter of course, they are not obliged to do so.169  This discretion generates 
substantial variation in prisoner qualifications for franchise among 
Australian states and territories.170  This situation is further complicated by 
the fact that some jurisdictions choose to disenfranchise, while others do not.  
By legislating at the Commonwealth level to disenfranchise prisoners—
regardless of the effect of state law—Parliament imposes a secondary 
punishment, in breach of the doctrine of federalism.171  The prisoner will not 
only serve his or her sentence, but in jurisdictions that do adopt the 
Commonwealth rule per se, will be disenfranchised from state and federal 
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elections.172  Alternatively, in a state that does not adopt the Commonwealth 
rule, the prisoner will not lose his or her right to vote at federal elections.173 
To complicate matters further, there is no uniformity amongst the 
states, or between the states and the Commonwealth, as to what constitutes 
an offense punishable by imprisonment.174  For example, in Western 
Australia, there is a scheme whereby persons who default on payment of 
fines lose their drivers license.175  This is a stark contrast with the Australian 
Capitol Territory (“ACT”) or in Queensland, where the same defaulter 
would actually be imprisoned.176  In this scenario, an Australian citizen in 
Western Australia who defaults on fines retains the right to vote, whereas a 
citizen in ACT or Queensland who is jailed for defaulting on fines may lose 
his/her federal voting rights, depending on the length of the confinement.177  
In this light, the E & R Amendment appears unreasonable because its effects 
are arbitrary and differ from one territory to the next. 
2. The Disproportionate Disenfranchisement Imposed upon Aboriginals 
by the E & R Amendment Interferes with Their RDA-Guaranteed 
Right to Participate in Elections 
To demonstrate indirect discrimination, a plaintiff must establish that 
there has been “adverse effect discrimination.”178  Adverse effect 
discrimination is evidenced by an article of legislation that differentiates for 
an irrelevant or impermissible reason, or has the “same or substantially the 
same effect as if different treatment had been accorded precisely for a reason 
of that kind.”179  The provisions of paragraph (c) of subsection 9(1A) of the 
RDA express that any act that has the “purpose or effect of nullifying or 
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of . . . any human right or 
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fundamental freedom in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other 
field of public life,” is prohibited.180 
The disproportionate effects of prisoner disenfranchisement paint a 
picture of systemic and institutionalized disadvantage.  According to the 
2006 census, the total Australian population was just under twenty 
million.181  The Aboriginal population was approximately 510,160, or 
approximately 2.5% of the total population.182  Of greater importance, 
however, is the Aboriginal voting age population.  In 2007, the Aboriginal 
population that could, and was required to vote, was estimated to be 1.7% of 
the current voting age population.183  Without every one of the votes 
counted, the Aboriginal population would have difficulty creating legislative 
change.  
Between 2000 and 2006, the rate of Aboriginal imprisonment in 
Australia rose substantially.184  Today, Aboriginal offenders are 
approximately three times more likely than non-Aboriginal offenders to 
receive a sentence of imprisonment, regardless of their prior history.185  This 
rate of imprisonment is likely the result of a number of factors, including 
socio-economic status, mental health status, education, and homelessness.186  
Unfortunately, Aboriginal incarceration rates continue to increase 
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disproportionately despite the efforts outlined by the Royal Commission187 
in the Aboriginal Deaths in Custody Report.188 
In Australia, the percentage of Aboriginal prisoners increased from 
15% of the total prison population in 1993, to 24% in 2007.189  Although 
felon disenfranchisement laws is justified on race-neutral grounds, the 
discriminatory impact remains.190  Laws denying felons the right to vote 
weaken the voting power of minority communities.191  This is significant 
because minorities comprise approximately one-quarter of all convicted 
offenders who are prevented from voting.192  With the sole exception of 
incarceration in the state of Tasmania, an Aboriginal person is thirteen times 
more likely to be imprisoned than a non-Indigenous person.193  In Western 
Australia, Aboriginal persons are twenty-one times more likely to be in 
prison than non-Aboriginal persons194—a staggering number, considering 
the population of Western Australia is only 3.8% Aboriginal.195 
Excluding prisoners with indeterminate,196 life-term, and periodic-
detention sentences, in 2007, the median aggregate sentence for prisoners 
was three years.197  As a result of the E & R Amendment, the median 
prisoner is disenfranchised.  This is particularly alarming, considering those 
who were sentenced for indeterminate or life sentences did not factor into 
the aggregate.  The higher rate at which Aboriginal offenders are sent to 
prison stems mainly from:  1) a higher rate of conviction for violent crime, 
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and 2) a higher rate of re-offending, particularly following imposition of 
sanctions intended as alternatives to fulltime imprisonment.198 
The end result is that approximately 48% of Aboriginal prisoners are 
unable to vote because of the three-year voting restriction.199  
Comparatively, only about 39% of the non-Aboriginal prison population has 
been disenfranchised.200  From the prison statistics alone, it is evident the E 
& R Amendment has disproportionately disenfranchised Aboriginal voters.  
The proportion of voting-age convicted Aboriginals is higher than their non-
Indigenous counterparts.  This is increasingly true in states adopting the 
Commonwealth rule per se.201   
Disproportionate disenfranchisement prevents Aboriginal people from 
meaningfully participating in Australian politics and society as a whole.  
Aboriginal people have, in the government’s own words, “less opportunity 
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political 
process.”202  As of 2007, not a single Aboriginal person had been elected to 
the Australian Commonwealth House of Representatives, and only two had 
been elected to the Commonwealth Senate.203  The fact that Aboriginal 
people lack proportional representation in elected bodies further prevents 
meaningful participation. 
A variety of factors relate to the over-representation of Aboriginals in 
custody.  The Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody noted 
that the overrepresentation of Aboriginal people in prison was directly 
related to the “whole of life” experience of Aboriginal people.204  The 
Commission found that “the single significant contributing factor to 
incarceration is the disadvantaged and unequal position of Aboriginal people 
in Australian society in every way, whether socially, economically or 
culturally.”205  By sanctioning the pattern of disadvantage and stigmatizing 
Aboriginal prisoners by not allowing them to vote, the racial distinctions 
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become more pronounced, pervasive, and entrenched by the politically 
powerful non-Indigenous majority.206 
Further, disenfranchisement does not end at the prison walls.  
Theoretically, the end of a prison sentence restores the prisoner’s voting 
rights.  In practice, however, ex-prisoners must apply to re-enroll.207  This 
leads to a variety of different problems, including the fact that many ex-
prisoners are homeless and unable to establish a stable address.208  
Additionally, the evidentiary requirements to re-enroll and dependence upon 
witnesses who may be in positions of power, but who can attest to prisoner 
identity, can also work against the intent of enfranchising legislation.209  As a 
result of their convictions, many prisoners suffer permanent disqualification 
and deregistration by default.210 
Disenfranchised Indigenous minorities are uniquely situated to suffer 
political injustices that have not been rectified by their unequal 
representation in political and economic institutions.211  Minor parties in 
Australia, such as the Greens,212 expressed concerns about the racially 
discriminatory impact of removing the right to vote.213  Even in the debates, 
one senator expressed doubt about such disenfranchising measures: 
Firstly, it is up to the courts to judge people and penalise them 
by sending them to prison.  That is where the penalty should 
start and finish.  It should not be up to us to be legislating in a 
general way to take away the rights of people who go to 
prison—in particular, basic civil rights and the right to vote.214 
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The statistics demonstrate that the percentage of Aboriginal people who 
are incarcerated is disproportionate, and growing.215  Such findings suggest 
that as conviction rates for Aboriginals rise, Aboriginal voting may decline.  
The racial disparity in voting participation caused by disenfranchisement 
laws will grow with time due to the current rise in Aboriginal incarceration, 
coupled with the increasing number of disenfranchised Aboriginal voters.  
This demonstrates the disproportionate effect the E & R Amendment has on 
Aboriginal prisoners.  
IV. THE CONFLICT OF LAW BETWEEN THE E & R AMENDMENT AND THE 
RDA CAN BE RESOLVED WITH CORRECTIVE LEGISLATION REPEALING 
THE E & R AMENDMENT’S THREE-YEAR BAN 
Two major methods exist to address conflicts of law:  litigation and 
legislation.216  Empowering courts with discretion to disenfranchise felons at 
their sentencing seems appropriately individualized and a more legitimate 
way to punish and deter, in contrast to disenfranchisement by legislation for 
every prisoner serving a term of three or more years.217  However, given the 
courts’ historical reluctance to expand or address prisoner enfranchisement, 
Parliament should pass legislation overruling the E & R Amendment. 
Parliament has the ability to rectify the current felon 
disenfranchisement law.  Under section 51(xxvi) of the Constitution, 
Parliament has the power to make laws with respect to “[t]he people of any 
race, for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws.”218  
Additionally, Sections 7 and 24 of the Constitution require that Parliament 
be “directly chosen by the people.”  While this Constitutional provision does 
not guarantee individual voting rights, disenfranchising a segment of the 
population is unacceptable except on incapacity grounds—such as age or 
mental illness—which are both listed qualities in the text of the 
Constitution.219  Neither ethnicity nor a felony conviction should qualify as 
incapacity grounds.  The most simple and just solution would be to dispose 
of prisoner disenfranchisement.  This solution would also present the most 
efficient way of eliminating disparities between Aboriginal and non-
Indigenous prisoners resulting from the E & R Amendment’s 
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disenfranchising provision.  It can be expected, however, that this potential 
solution will be met with significant opposition.220 
In the event that Parliament does not find the popular support to 
remove felon disenfranchisement entirely, Parliament can rectify the 
discrepancy between the seriousness of a crime and its sentence by 
mandating that the restrictions relate directly to the crime committed.221  The 
punishment should fit the crime.  This option, by its very nature, would not 
prove as powerful as removing the E & R Amendment’s three-year provision 
outright.  Vickie Roach’s case is one that would benefit from making the 
punishment fit the crime.  None of the crimes222 for which she was convicted 
carried a three-year sentence, but as a result of the consecutive structure of 
her sentences, she is nevertheless disenfranchised.  As such, Parliament 
should make the punishment for prisoners like Vickie fit the crimes 
committed. 
Parliament should take action in order to retain legitimacy in the eyes 
of the world.223  Prisoner disenfranchisement is strikingly inconsistent with a 
number of international human rights norms and principles.224  The rights 
and interests of Indigenous peoples are evolving through the dynamic 
process of international lawmaking.225  The right not to be discriminated 
against on the basis of race, in a systematic way, has the legal status of jus 
cogens; that is, the prohibition of systematic racial discrimination has the 
legal status of a peremptory norm of law from which no derogation is 
permitted.226   
In contrast to the Australian High Court’s decision in the Roach 
opinion, various constitutional courts have recently struck down not only 
lifetime voting bans, but even the exclusion from voting of persons who are 
currently incarcerated.227  For instance, in 1999, the South African 
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Constitutional Court required that the government allow prisoners to vote, 
stating:  
The vote of each and every citizen is a badge of dignity and 
personhood.  Quite literally, it says that everybody counts.  In a 
country of great disparities of wealth and power it declares that 
whoever we are, whether rich or poor, exalted or disgraced, we 
all belong to the same democratic . . . nation; that our destinies 
are intertwined in a single interactive polity.228 
In other jurisdictions, most notably Canada and the United Kingdom, 
the disenfranchisement of prisoners was deemed not rationally connected to 
the object of punishment, and the courts of those countries disallowed it for 
this reason.229  A citizen’s right to vote should depend on his ability to make 
a rational choice, not his prison status.  Loss of voting rights has no place 
within a penal system whose reform policies aim to encourage the prisoner’s 
identification with, rather than his alienation from, the community at 
large.230  As a result, every prisoner should be entitled to vote in all elections 
concerning his community and the community should facilitate such 
political participation.231 
Many international legal organizations, like the United Nations and 
the European Court of Human Rights, would likely support the abolition of 
the three-year disenfranchisement rule.232  The U.N. Committee on Human 
Rights has stated that the Committee “fails to discern the justification for 
such a practice in modern times, considering that it amounts to an additional 
punishment and that it does not contribute towards the prisoner’s 
reformation and social rehabilitation.”233  In the event that Parliament does 
not correct this conflict of law, the High Court’s hands are tied until the next 
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challenge is brought, and even then constitutional avoidance may be 
possible, unless the two laws are at issue.234 
V. CONCLUSION 
Vickie Lee Roach personifies convicted individuals who have been 
improperly, undemocratically, and systematically disenfranchised.  The E & 
R Amendment’s ban indirectly discriminates against Aboriginal people, 
because it has a discriminating effect that does not justify the status quo.   
As a result of the E & R Amendment, Aboriginal people are 
disproportionately disenfranchised on a massive scale, in violation of the 
RDA’s statutory guarantee of equality under the law.  Parliament should 
resolve the resulting conflict of law through legislation—preferably 
repealing the three-year disenfranchisement provision of the E & R 
Amendment.  The disproportionate disenfranchisement of Aboriginal 
people—perpetuating racism and preventing the population’s meaningful 
participation in Australian politics—should end. 
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